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Summary 
This thesis identifies the strengths and weaknesses of multilevel governance 
when the theory is applied to the case law of the Court of Justice. The method 
used is thus first and foremost a case law study. Materials from various 
scholars have been used to identify relevant cases and provide legal analyses of 
the case law, as well as provide a description of the theory. Through the 
description of the theory, three main pillars of multilevel governance are 
identified; (1) the notion of various actors at different levels, (2) influencing 
authoritative decision making, (3) though interactions in a reflexive process. 
These key concepts of the theory are applied when studying the case law of the 
Court of Justice. 
 
The case law studied in this thesis is that of environmental protection as a 
justification to limitations to free movement of goods. In order to further 
understand the case law of the Court of Justice on the subject, a short 
introduction to how free movement of goods and environmental protection 
are incorporated in the Treaty framework is provided. Subsequently the two 
grounds of justification are described and discussed; Art 36 TFEU, and the 
justification of mandatory requirement, which is created by the Court of 
Justice. Subsequently the proportionality test is described and discussed. 
 
It is argued that the analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice, using the 
theory of multilevel governance, shows that the theory has several strengths. 
Instances of various actors, shaping the law in a reflexive process can be 
identified. However, some weaknesses can also been observed. It is argued that 
these weaknesses are foremost due to the nature of case law, and the way that 
the Court of Justice formulates its judgments. Although the weaknesses must 
be kept in mind, it is argued that the theory can serve as a tool to understand 
the creation of law though the case law of the Court of Justice. Such 
understanding of the creating and shaping of law can subsequently serve as a 
steppingstone to analyze the former from e.g. a perspective of democratic 
legitimacy in further research. 
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Sammanfattning 
Detta examensarbete identifierar styrkor och svagheter i multilevel governance-
teorin, när denna appliceras på EU-domstolens rättspraxis. Metoden som 
används är alltså främst en rättsfallsanalys. Material från ett flertal författare har 
använts för att identifiera relevanta rättsfall och ge juridiska analyser av 
rättspraxisen, samt även ge en beskrivning av teorin. Genom beskrivningen av 
teorin har tre huvudpelare identifierats; (1) uppfattningen om flera aktörer på 
olika nivåer, (2) som påverkar auktoritativt beslutsfattande, (3) genom 
interaktioner i en reflexiv process. Dessa nyckelkoncept i teorin appliceras vid 
undersökningen av EU-domstolens rättspraxis. 
 
Den rättspraxis som studeras i detta examensarbete rör miljöskydd som ett 
berättigande, vid inskränkningar i fria rörligheten för varor. För att få 
ytterligare förståelse för EU-domstolens rättspraxis på området ges först en 
kort introduktion kring hur fria rörligheten för varor, samt miljöskydd är 
skyddade i fördragen. Sedan beskrivs och diskuteras de två grunderna för 
berättigande; artikel 36 FEUF, och det av EU-domstolen skapade berättigandet 
tvingande hänsyn. Därefter beskrivs och diskuteras proportionalitetstestet. 
 
I analysen argumenteras att analysen av EU-domstolens rättspraxis visar att 
teorin har åtskilliga styrkor, då flera exempel av olika aktörer som formar rätten 
i en reflexiv process kan identifieras. Dock kan även några svagheter 
observeras. Det argumenteras att dessa svagheter är framförallt på grund av 
rättspraxisens natur, och hur EU-domstolen formulerar sina domar. Även om 
svagheterna ska hållas i minnet, så argumenteras det för att teorin kan användas 
som en metod för att förstå hur lag skapas genom EU-domstolens praxis. 
Sådan förståelse av skapandet av lag kan därefter användas som ett första steg 
för att sedan i kommande studier analysera skapandet och formandet av lag 
från t.ex. ett demokratiskt legitimitets-perspektiv. 
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1 Introduction  
At the time of writing this essay (spring of 2017) the strength and future of the 
EU is more uncertain than a year ago. For example, the formal initiation of 
Brexit has taken place,1 and several anti-EU movements have been shown able 
to challenge the existing political landscape.2 One destabilizing factor, in 
regards of the trust in the EU, is the perceived democratic deficit of the latter.3 
It can be argued that the EU needs to come to term with such issues of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, in order to subsist. 
 
In order to further understand how law is created and shaped, it can be useful 
to apply a theory. In this thesis the theory of multilevel governance will be assessed. 
In short, the key concepts of multilevel governance include the idea of various 
actors, influencing authoritative decision making, in a reflexive process.4 More 
specifically, the thesis will assess how well the theory can be used to 
understand how law is made and shaped in the case law of the Court. By 
applying the theory on the case law of the Court, strengths and weaknesses of 
the theory will be identified. The thesis will thus help to further research how 
well the theory of multilevel governance can be used as a tool to understand 
how law is made and shaped in the case law of the Court. Such understanding 
of the lawmaking processes in the EU can be seen as steppingstone to 
subsequently analyze and evaluate the former, e.g. in the light of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability. 
 
The rest of this first chapter will be dedicated to further describe the purpose, 
research questions and delimitation of the thesis, in section 1.1. Thereafter, in 
                                                
1 See e.g. Carmona, Jesús et al. (2017) UK Withdrawal from the European Union: Legal and Procedural 
Issues. European Parliamentary Research Service. p. 1.  
2 For example, the anti-EU extreme right wing candidate, Marine Le Pen, went to the second 
round in the French presidential election, see e.g. Faye, Olivier (2017) ”Présidentielle : Marine 
Le Pen se qualifie pour un difficile second tour” in: Le Monde 23 april 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/04/23/presidentielle-
marine-le-pen-se-qualifie-pour-un-difficile-second-tour_5116042_4854003.html 
3 See Fossedal, Andreas & Hix Simon (2006). ”Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: 
A Response to Majone and Moravcsik” in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 44 Issue 3, pp. 
533-562. p. 556. 
4 See Chapter two. 
 6 
section 1.2., the method and materials will be described and discussed. In 
Chapter two, the theory of multilevel governance will be briefly described, 
focusing on the key elements of that theory. In the following Chapter three, 
the theory of multilevel governance will be applied in order to analyze the case 
law of the Court concerning environmental protection as a justification to 
measures limiting the free movement of goods. Chapter three consists of four 
main parts, the first one giving a short introduction of the field of law, the 
second and third parts both concern possible grounds of justification, art 36 
and mandatory requirements respectively, and the fourth part concerns the 
proportionality test. Thereafter, in Chapter four, the use of multilevel 
governance as a theory when analyzing case law of the Court, will be discussed 
and assessed. Finally, in Chapter five some concluding remarks will be made. 
 
1.1 Purpose, Research Questions and Delimitation 
1.1.1 Purpose 
Multilevel governance is a theory that can be used in order to understand the 
creation and shaping of law.5 The theory of multilevel governance has been 
used to analyze e.g. development and implementation of policy and law, 
primarily within the context of the EU.6 Furthermore, the theory can serve as a 
steppingstone to subsequently analyze how law is made and shaped from e.g. a 
perspective of democratic legitimacy and accountability.7 The wide possibilities 
of using the theory as an analytical tool, has however not been completely 
explored.8 
 
                                                
5 Pagoulatos, George & Tsoukalis, Loukas (2013). “Multilevel Governance” in Jones, Erik et al 
(ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the European Union pp. 63-72. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 
64. 
6 See e.g. Fairbrass, Jenny & Jordan, Andrew (2004). ”Multi-level Governance and 
Environmental Policy” in: Backe & Flinders (eds) Multi-level Governance pp 147-164. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
7 See chapter 2. 
8 See e.g. Kjaer, Poul F. (2010). Between Governing and Governance: on the Emergence, Function and 
Form of Europe's Post-national Constellation. Oxford: Hart. p. 8ff. 
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In light of the above, the purpose of this thesis is to assess how the theory of 
multilevel governance can be used to deepen or broaden the understanding of 
how law is made and shaped in the case law of the Court of Justice.9  
1.1.2 Research Questions 
In light of the purpose of the thesis as described above, this thesis aims at 
answering the following questions:  
 
(1) Which are the strengths of the theory of multilevel governance when applied to case 
law of the Court of Justice? 
 
(2) Which are the weaknesses of the theory of multilevel governance when applied to 
case law of the Court of Justice? 
 
The research questions are analytical, and will be answered in the analysis in 
Chapter four, using the application of the theory on the case law in Chapter 
three as a basis for identifying weaknesses and strengths to the theory when 
applied in a case law study. In order to be able to answer the questions, a 
description of the theory will be given in Chapter two. 
 
1.1.3 Delimitation 
It is outside of the scope of this thesis to describe and apply all formulations of 
the theory of multilevel governance. Some key concepts from multilevel 
governance will be described in Chapter two, and will subsequently be used to 
analyze the case law in Chapter three.  
 
Moreover the case law analyzed through the perspective of multilevel 
governance will be limited to the case law of the Court concerning free 
movement of goods, and how limitations to the latter can be justified due to 
environmental protection. Since the focus will be on case law concerning 
environmental protection as a justification, the nature of free movement of 
goods, and the definition of measures of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
                                                
9 Henceforth ”the Court”. 
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on imports (MEE:s) will only be briefly described in section 3.1. in order to 
understand the area in question.  
 
1.2 Method and Materials 
1.2.1 Method 
This section will briefly describe and discuss the method used in this thesis. 
Before discussing certain aspects of the method, the method applied will be 
generally described.  
 
This thesis is a qualitative study, evaluating strengths and weaknesses of 
multilevel governance when applied to the case law of the Court.10 In order to 
answer the research questions above, key concepts of the theory of multilevel 
governance will be described and subsequently applied to case law of the 
Court.11 Using the application on the case law,12 weaknesses and strengths of 
the theory will be described and analyzed.13 
 
In order to describe the legal framework of the case law studied; a EU legal 
method will be applied. In light of the purpose and research questions, relevant 
primary law will be described.14 
 
In the subsections hereunder, some specific aspects of the method applied will 
be discussed. 
 
1.2.1.1 Using the Theory of Multilevel Governance as an Analytical 
Tool 
Multilevel governance is widely used in studies on policy and law regarding 
environmental protection.15 Due to the scope of the present thesis, as well as 
                                                
10 On the use of multilevel governance as a theory in the study of EU law, see e.g. Craig, Paul 
& De Búrca, Gráinne (2015). EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 6. ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press. p. 25. 
11 See Chapter two. 
12 See Chapter three. 
13 See Chapter four. 
14 Hettne, Jörgen & Otken Eriksson, Ida (eds.) (2011). EU-rättslig metod: teori och genomslag i 
svensk rättstillämpning. 6 ed. Norstedts juridik. p. 40. 
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of the various formulations of the theory, only the basic notion of selected key 
concepts of the theory of multi-level governance will be used as descriptive 
tools when analyzing the case law.16 Key concepts from the theory will be 
described in Chapter two, and subsequently used to highlight relevant elements 
of the case law. 
 
In order to assess the theory of multilevel governance, the latter will be used to 
analyze the case law of the Court. It is thus worth to note that this study is 
done with the presupposition that it is possible to apply the theory in such a 
study, and that such analysis can be fruitful. Regarding the application it should 
be clarified that the theory will be used in order to highlight, to the theory 
relevant, aspects of the case law and then assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of the theory in such an application.  
 
1.2.1.2 Using a Case Study as a Method 
As is shown in the purpose and research question above, this thesis constitutes 
primarily of applying the theory of multilevel governance on a case study. Brief 
descriptions of e.g. the historical background to the law and analyses of the law 
by legal scholars will be made as needed in order to contextualize the case 
study and get a deeper understanding of the area of law.  
 
1.2.1.3 The Area of Case Law Chosen  
The case law of the Court studied in this thesis concerns limitations to the free 
movement of goods, and how such can be justified due to environmental 
protection. Multilevel governance has proven to be a viable theory when 
analyzing environmental policy and legislation,17 which could thus also be the 
case for analyzing case law on the same subject. 
 
                                                                                                                        
15 See e.g. Fisher, Elizabeth, Lange, Bettina & Scotford, Eloise (2013). Environmental Law: Text, 
Cases, and Materials. Oxford University Press. p. 1037 ff. 
16 The theory of multilevel governance can also be used as a normative theory, see e.g. 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus (2001). ”The Governance Approach to European Integration” in Journal 
of Common Market Studies. Vol 39, Issue 2, pp. 245-285. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. p. 251. 
17 See e.g. Fairbrass & Jordan (2004). 
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1.2.2 Materials 
1.2.2.1 Materials Describing Multilevel Governance 
In order to give a wide description, and identify key concepts, of the theory, 
the work of various scholars on multilevel governance has been used in this 
thesis. Amongst other, this thesis uses the description of multilevel governance 
as provided by Hooghe and Marks,18 two scholars who are central in the 
formulation of the theory.19 Moreover, the works of e.g. Piattoni20, and 
Jachtenfuchs21, as well as various chapters from Multi-level Governance by editors 
Backe & Flinders,22 are used.  
 
1.2.2.2 Selection of Cases  
This thesis analyses a number of selected cases from the Court in the field of 
free movement of good and limitation to the latter due to protection of the 
environment. Because of the limited scope of the thesis, I have chosen to study 
“classical” case law in the relevant area, seeking inspiration regarding the 
selection of the cases from e.g. de Sadeleer23, Jacobs24, and Nowag25. The cases 
studied constitute a valid selection in relation to the purpose and research 
question for two primary reasons.  
 
Firstly, the purpose of this thesis (as described above) is to assess how 
multilevel governance can be applied to case law of the Court. Thus the cases 
at hand can provide an understanding of such mechanism, just as well as any 
                                                
18 Hooghe, Liesbeth & Marks, Gary (2000). “Optimality and Authority: A Critique of 
Neoclassical Theory” in Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 38 Issue 5, pp. 795-815.; 
Hooghe, Liesbeth & Marks, Gary. (2001a) Multi-level Governance and European Integration. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield; Hooghe, Liesbeth & Marks, Gary (2001b). “Types of Multi-
Level Governance” in European Integration Online Papers. Vol. 5, Issue 11, pp. 1-16. 
19 Pagoulatos & Tsoukalis (2013). p. 65. 
20 Piattoni, Simona. (2010). The Theory of Multi-level Governance: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative 
Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
21 Jachtenfuchs (2001). 
22 Backe, Ian & Flinders, Matthew (eds) (2004b). Multi-level Governance. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
23 De Sadeleer, Nicolas (2014). EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
24 Jacobs, Francis (2006). ”The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the 
Environment ” in Journal of Environmental Law. Vol 18, Issue 2, pp. 185-206. 
25 Nowag, Julian. (2017). Environmental Integration in Competition and Free-Movement Laws. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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other cases. Secondly, being “classical” case law, these cases are frequently 
studied to understand the legal position of the question at hand. 
 
1.2.2.3 Other Materials 
In order to deepen the understanding of the case law, and also to present 
former interpretations of the case law, continuous references to former 
analyses of the case law will be made in Chapter 3, as provided by e.g. 
Gormley26, de Sadeleer27, Nowag28, and Poncelet29. 
 
1.3 Previous Research 
Multilevel governance is widely used in studies on environmental protection. 
The theory is often used in order to assess the creation and application of 
secondary legislation in EU, as well as environmental policy in individual 
states.30 One example of this is a study of Fairbrass & Jordan31, focusing on 
environmental policy in the United Kingdom.32 
 
The case law of the Court regarding environmental protection as a justification 
to limitations to free movement of goods has been widely studied. Scholars 
have for example studied the field from various perspectives, such as those of 
legal certainty,33 environmental integration,34 and realism.35 
 
                                                
26 Gormley, Laurence W. (2005) ”The Genesis of the Rule of Reason in the Free Movement of 
Goods” in: Schrauwen, Anette. (ed) Rule of Reason: Rethinking another Classic of European Legal 
Doctrine. Groningen: Europa Law Publishing.; Gormley, Laurence W. (2011). ”Free Movement 
of Goods within the EU: Some Issues and an Irish Perspective” in Irish Jurist. Vol. 46, pp. 74-
95.  
27 De Sadeleer (2014). 
28 Nowag (2017). 
29 Poncelet, Charles. (2014). “Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection in EU 
Law: A Troubled Relationship?” in International Community Law Review. Vol. 15, Issue 2, pp. 171-
210.  
30 See e.g. Fisher et al. (2013) p. 1037 ff. 
31 Fairbrass & Andrew (2004).  
32 Ibid, p. 154ff. 
33 Jacobs (2006). 
34 Nowag (2017). 
35 Engle, Eric (2008). ”Environmental Protection as an Obstacle to Free Movement of Goods: 
Realist Jurisprudence in Articles 28 and 30 or the E.C. Treaty” in Journal of Law and Commerce, 
Vol. 27, Issue 1 pp. 113-136.  
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In this thesis I will thus use previous studies on free movement of goods and 
environmental protection to be able to give a description of the legal position 
of the areas in question. Moreover I will use previous research in order to 
identify key cases.36 I will furthermore draw inspiration from previous studies 
using multilevel governance as a perspective or theory, in order to fruitfully use 
the theory in this study on the case law of the Court regarding free movement 
of goods and environmental protection.  
 
This study will thus contribute to the study of multilevel governance, insofar as 
it will assess its weaknesses and strengths when applied to the case law of the 
Court.  
                                                
36 See section 1.2.2.2. 
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2 The Theory of Multilevel Governance 
In this chapter the theory of multilevel governance will be presented. First, a 
brief background of the theory will be given. Thereafter the key concepts of 
multilevel governance will be identified and described, in order to use these key 
concepts to analyze the case law in the next Chapter.  
 
Multilevel governance is a theory first formulated in the 1990s by Marks37 and 
subsequently developed by e.g. the latter and Hooghe.38 Multilevel governance 
was initially used to conceptualize how law is made and shaped in the EU,39 
but has later also been used to study the legal processes within other contexts.40 
Multilevel governance as a theory has been applied to three areas: political 
mobilization, polity structuring and policy-making.41 In this thesis, the role of 
multilevel governance within the sphere of policy-making will be described, 
insomuch as the process of how the Court “actually functions and produces 
authoritative decisions”42 will be studied. The theory can be seen as a reaction 
towards intergovernmentalism, and neo-functionalism. Intergovernmentalism 
focuses on the Member States as the main actors in lawmaking, and 
integration.43 Neo-functionalism on the other hand sees the EU as central.44 
 
Having provided a short overview of the background of the theory, the theory 
itself will now be described. Multilevel governance has been defined as a 
“dispersion of authoritative decision-making across multiple […] levels”.45 
                                                
37 Marks, Gary (1992). “Structural Policy in the European Community,” in A. Sbragia, ed., 
Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community. pp. 191-224. 
Washington D. C.: Brookings Institute. 
38 See e.g. Hooghe & Marks (2000).; Hooghe & Marks (2001b).“ 
39 Piattoni (2010). p. 18. 
40 Welch, Stephen & Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline (2004). “Multi-level Governance and 
International Relations” in Backe, Ian & Flinders, Matthew (eds) Multi-level Governance. pp. 127-
144. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
41 Piattoni (2010). p. 19. 
42 ibid. 
43 Stone Sweet, Alec (2010). ”The European Court of Justice and the judicialization of EU 
governance” in Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 5, Issue. 2, pp. 5-39. p. 19. 
44 Piattoni (2010) p. 18. See also Peters, B. Guy & Pierre, Jon. (2004) “Multi-level Governance 
and Democracy: a Faustian Bargain?” in Backe, Ian & Flinders, Matthew (ed) Multi-level 
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 82. 
45 Hooghe & Marks (2001a). p xi. 
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According to the theory, various actors have decision-making competencies 
and are thus able to create and shape law.46 According to the multilevel 
governance theory, it is thus not only states that decide upon, and shape, law;47 
sub-national as well as intra-national and supra-national actors also govern law 
making.48 Apart from identifying different actors in such territorial levels, actors 
can also be identified in jurisdictional levels, thus rendering citizens, the 
legislative and executive organizations, the judicial institutions as well as third 
party intermediaries potential actors in the making and shaping of law.49  
 
The idea of governance in the theory implies the notion of steering and shaping 
authoritative decision-making. Governance can moreover be contrasted with 
the idea of government, the latter being based on a unifying authority.50 Multilevel 
governance is descriptive, insomuch as it primarily shows how governance is 
done, and not why.51 The idea of governance thus implies the coordination of 
social relations in the absence of a unifying authority.52 It is useful to 
distinguish between formal and informal governance. Formal governance 
includes the official recognition of the capacity of creating and shaping law and 
policy. Informal governance is the ability to create and shape law and policy 
though non-formal means.53  
 
Multilevel governance can be carried out both vertically, i.e. between central 
and lower levels of actors, and horizontally, i.e. between actors on the same 
level, such as between governments.54 As emphasized by Delanty,55 it is not 
possible to identify a specific mechanism through which different actors create 
                                                
46 DeBardeleben, Joan & Hurrelmann, Achim (2007). “Introduction” in DeBardeleben, Joan & 
Hurrelmann, Achim (eds) Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance: Legitimacy, Representation 
and Accountability in the European Union. pp. 1-14. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 1-3. 
47 Hooghe & Marks (2000) p. 795. 
48 Hooghe & Marks (2001b) p. 1. 
49 Piattoni (2010) p. 28. 
50 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (2017). Multilevel Constitutionalism for Multilevel Governance of Public 
Goods: Methodology Problems in International Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing. p. 22-23. 
51 Kjaer (2010) p. 9. 
52 Welch, & Kennedy-Pipe (2004) p. 129. 
53 Hooghe & Marks (2001b). p. 3. 
54 Petersmann (2017) p. 33. 
55 Delanty, Gerard (2007). ”Europeanization and Democracy: the Question of Cultural 
Identity” in DeBardeleben, Joan & Hurrelmann, Achim Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel 
Governance: Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
 15 
and shape law in a multilevel governance context. Rather, the relevant aspect is 
the “mutual interactions of the various levels” - the reflexivity of the process.56 
According to the theory of multilevel governance, law making is furthermore 
characterized by non-hierarchical interactions between the actors.57 
 
From the description of multilevel governance as provided above, one can thus 
group the key concepts of the theory into three pillars: (1) the notion of 
various actors at different levels, (2) influencing authoritative decision making, 
(3) though interactions in a reflexive process.  
 
The three pillars of the theory of multilevel governance identified above will, in 
the upcoming Chapter, be applied to the case law of the Court. First however, 
some comments will be made on how the theory of multilevel governance can 
be used, more than identifying the creation of law and policy. 
 
As can be seen above, the theory of multilevel governance is mainly 
descriptive. It can thus be used to further understand how law and policy are 
created and shaped. However, as Petersmann emphasizes, it is furthermore 
possible to weigh the empirical application of multilevel governance against 
normative standards.58 For example, the theory of multilevel governance can 
serve as an effective way of describing the process, a description that can later 
be used to assess the democratic legitimacy, and accountability of the 
lawmaking process.59  
 
In the case of EU law, there is an ongoing debate on the democratic deficit of 
the former.60 Connecting the theory of multilevel governance with this notion 
of democratic deficiency, DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann have described three main 
dimensions of the tension between multilevel governance and democracy in 
the EU. The first dimension focuses on the notion of the people of the EU 
                                                
56 Delanty (2007). p. 78. 
57 Papadopoulos, Yannis. (2007). “Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and 
Multilevel Governance” in European Law Journal. Vol. 13, Issue 4. p. 469. 
58 Petersmann (2017) p. 20. 
59 Backe, Ian & Flinders, Matthew (2004a). ”Conclusions and Implications” in Backe, Ian & 
Flinders, Matthew (eds) Multi-level Governance. pp. 195-206. Oxford University Press. p. 202. 
60 See e.g. Fossedal & Hix (2006).  
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being socially and culturally diverse, which creates weak conditions for 
democratization. The second dimension regards the tension between a strong 
capacity of solving common problems, which can be weighed against a 
difficulty to secure accountability of the decision makers. The third dimension 
problematizes how representation can be valid both for citizens, as well as 
Member States of the union.61 
 
As can be seen from the research questions, it is out of the scope of this thesis 
to assess the democratic legitimacy of the law and policy process regarding 
environmental protection as a justification to measures limiting free movement 
of goods. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of the theory of multilevel governance when applied to the case law of the 
Court. Understanding such weaknesses and strengths of the theory regarding 
its applicability of the case law of the Court is thus vital both to understand the 
law making processes, but also to subsequently criticize such law making 
processes, e.g. from the perspective of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability. 
 
                                                
61 DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann (2007) p. 6. 
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3 Application of Multilevel Governance on the 
Case Law of the Court of Justice 
This chapter will use the key concepts from multilevel governance, identified in 
Chapter two, to analyze the case law of the Court of Justice.62 In the respective 
subsections, the relevant legal questions will be identified and described. 
Moreover, the key concepts of multilevel governance will be applied to the 
case law of the Court, and thus highlight how the case law is interpreted when 
applying this theory. 
 
First some introductory remarks will be made on the legal framework studied; 
free movement of goods and how limitations to the latter can be justified by 
environmental protection. Thereafter the two grounds of justification - Art 36 
and mandatory requirements - will be presented and analyzed. Finally the 
Court’s use of the proportionality test will be described and analyzed by 
applying the theory of multilevel governance. 
 
3.1 Introductory Remarks on the Legal Framework  
This section gives a short introduction of the legal frameworks of the free 
movement of goods, and environmental protection in the EU Treaties.  
 
3.1.1 Free Movement of Goods in the EU Treaties 
The internal market is a cornerstone in the EU.63 The legal basis for the 
internal market can be found in Art 3(3) TEU, and the further definition of the 
former is incorporated in Art 26(2) TFEU, which states that the internal 
market shall consist of “free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital”.  
 
                                                
62 Hereinafter ”the Court” 
63 See Oliver, Peter (2010). ”Introduction” in Oliver, Peter (ed.) Oliver on Free Movement of Goods 
in the European Union, 5th ed. pp. 1-14. Oxford: Hart. p.1. 
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Free movement of goods is thus one of the four freedoms, as stated in Art 
26(2) TFEU, and it is primarily regulated in Title II TFEU. Free movement of 
goods has in case law been described as one of the fundamental principles of 
the Treaty.64 For the free movement of goods to be realized, Art 34 TFEU 
states that all “quantitative restrictions of imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall be prohibited […]”.65 The concept of “measures having 
equivalent effect” (MEE:s) has been broadly interpreted by the Court,66 which 
renders a wide variety of measures to fall within this definition.67 Moreover no 
de minimis rule applies, which further enhances the width of MEE:s.68 
 
3.1.2 Environmental Protection in the EU Treaties 
Environmental protection was not incorporated in the first treaties. One of the 
first important steps in introducing environmental protection into the legal 
framework of the community was the adoption of the Community 
Environmental Policy in 1972. Environmental protection was subsequently 
incorporated in EU Treaties through the SEA in 1987.69 
 
In 3(3) TEU, where the internal market is defined, it is also stated that the 
latter should be based on inter alia “a high level of protection and improvement 
of the quality of the environment”. Regarding justifications to limitations on 
free movement of goods, Art 36 TFEU includes specific grounds which can 
indirectly be applied to justify MEE:s concerning environmental protection. 
This will be further described in section 3.2.1. Other relevant Treaty legislation 
regarding environmental protection includes the integration principle in Art 11 
TFEU.70 
 
                                                
64 C-320/03 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria [2005] EU:C:2005:684 
para 63.  
65 Art 34 TFEU is subject to justifications, which are described in Chapter 3. 
66 C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] EU:C:1974:82 para 5.   
67 For measures outside the scope of MEE:s see e.g. C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal 
proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] EU:C:1993:905 para 12ff. 
68 See e.g. C-67/97 Criminal proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme [1998] EU:C:1998:584 para 16. 
69 De Sadeleer (2014). p. 8ff. 
70 See Nowag (2017). 
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3.2 Environmental Protection as a Justification to 
Limitations to Free Movement of Goods 
This chapter presents the two ways in which environmental protection can 
serve as a justification to a limitation of the free movement of goods within the 
EU; (1) the explicit justification in Art 36 TFEU, and (2) mandatory 
requirements, a justification which is created though the case law of the 
Court.71  
 
3.2.1 The Nature and Application of Art 36 TFEU 
This section will describe and analyze the nature and application of Art 36 
TFEU. It is herein argued that by using the theory of multilevel governance on 
the case law, the active role of the Court in shaping the law can be observed. 
However, other instances of explicit multilevel governance are seen only 
sparsely in the case law of the Court regarding this provision.  
 
Art 36 TFEU72 provides an exhaustive list of grounds of justifications to 
limitations to free movement of goods. In order for Art 36 TFEU to be 
applicable, the Article states that the measure cannot be “a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States”. 
Moreover the measure needs to be proportionate.73 
 
Environmental protection as such is not listed as a justification under Art 36 
TFEU. However, other justifications in the Article, most prominently the 
ground of “protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants” can 
                                                
71 Furthermore, protection of fundamental rights can be used as a justification to limitations to 
free movement of goods. However, this ground is still developing in case law, and will not be 
further treated in this thesis. See e.g. de Sadeleer (2014) p. 300 ff. 
72 Formerly Art 36 EC Treaty, thereafter Art 30 EC. In this thesis, reference will be made 
consistantly to Art 36 TFEU, and thus references in former case law to Art 30 EC will as 
applicable be translated to Art 36 TFEU in order to facilitate for the reader. Article 36 TFEU 
reads in full: ”The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection 
of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States.” 
73 Regarding proportionality, see section 3.3. 
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constitute a ground of protection of the environment.74 Thus, various 
measures, though not all, aiming to protect the environment can be indirectly 
justified under the provision of Art 36 TFEU.75  
 
As has been described above, the most relevant justification in Art 36 TFEU, 
in the light of environmental protection, is that of the protection of health and 
life of humans, animals or plants. There are various interesting cases 
concerning the possibility of justification of measures for environmental 
protection under Art 36 TFEU. They regard everything from keeping of bees76 
to restrictions of the use of a certain chemical.77 The Court has in its case law 
underlined the importance of this justification, by stating that “the health and 
life of humans rank foremost among the property or interests protected by 
Article 36”.78 Although justifications under Art 36 TFEU are in general 
interpreted strictly,79 it can be argued that the Court though the statement 
above creates a larger space for itself to interpret such measures more 
generously.80  
 
In the case law of the Court concerning Art 36 TFEU, specific actors and legal 
orders can in some cases be identified. These actors are used by the Court to 
legitimize its reasoning. Toolex81 was a preliminary ruling concerning a Member 
State measure regarding a general prohibition on the use of a certain chemical, 
with a connected system of individual temporary exemptions. In this case the 
Court commented on the nature of Art 36 TFEU, arguing that the latter 
constituted a “fundamental [requirement] recognized by community law”.82 
The Court thus links the Treaty provision to the wider legal context of the 
community. Regarding the Court’s statement on the nature of Art 36 TFEU as 
                                                
74 See e.g. Enchelmaier, Stefan (2010). ”Art 36 TFEU: General” in: Oliver, Peter Oliver on Free 
Movement of Ggoods in the European Union. 5. ed. Oxford: Hart. p. 302; Nowag (2017) p. 161. 
75 See e.g. C-209/98 Entreprenørforeningens Affalds/Miljøsektion (FFAD) v Københavns Kommune 
[2000] EU:C:2000:279 para 46. 
76 C-67/97 para 14. 
77 C-473/98 Kemikalieinspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB [2000] EU:C:2000:379 para 34. 
78 C-320/93 Lucien Ortscheit GmbH contre Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH [1994] EU:C:1994:379 
para 16. See also C-473/98 para 38.  
79 De Sadeleer (2014) p. 285. 
80 ibid. p. 293. 
81 C-473/98. 
82 ibid para 25. 
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quoted above, it is also worth to note that the wording “fundamental 
requirements” reminds of the legitimization of mandatory requirements, which 
will be discussed in next section. 
 
In Bluhme,83 a preliminary ruling regarding the prohibition of keeping bees on a 
Danish island, other than a specific native subspecies of bees,84 the Court 
concluded that the measure hindered the free movement of goods.85 In its 
assessment of the applicability of Art 36 TFEU, the Court stated that the 
measure aimed at protecting the life of the bees in question.86 The Court also 
discussed whether the fact that the measure only concerned a subspecies of 
bees should be relevant in relation to the applicability of Art 36 TFEU.87 In 
this discussion, no references were made to other actors, or legal orders. The 
Court concluded that the measure fell within the scope of Art 36 TFEU.88  
 
The lack of explicit references to actors or legal orders, as showed in Bluhme, 
can also be seen in other cases concerning the applicability of Art 36 TFEU. 
One example is Aher-Waggon,89 a preliminary reference regarding a measure 
regulating the noise emissions of airplanes, in which the Court merely stated 
that the measure fell within the justification of Art 36 TFEU.90 Another 
example is Nijman,91 a preliminary reference regarding the prohibition of the 
selling of a plant-protection product in particular.92 Although no references to 
other actors were made, the Court in this last case referred to its own case law 
in the assessment of the measure.93  
 
In the case law on Art 36 TFEU, few references to other actors than the Court 
itself are made, although the Court has legitimized its reasoning with reference 
to the EU legal order in one of the cases included in this study. By the 
                                                
83 C-67/97. 
84 ibid para 14. 
85 ibid para 23. 
86 ibid para 33. 
87 ibid para 34. 
88 ibid para 38. 
89 C-389/96 Aher-Waggon GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1998] EU:C:1998:357. 
90 ibid para 19. 
91 C-125/88 Criminal proceedings against H. F. M. Nijman [1989] EU:C:1989:401. 
92 ibid para 2. 
93 ibid para 13. 
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references to its own case law, as well as its assertions of the nature of Art 36, 
the Court confirms its own position as an actor capable of shaping the law.  
 
3.2.2 The Creation and Application of Environmental 
Protection as a Mandatory Requirement 
This section describes and analyzes environmental protection as a mandatory 
requirement. First, mandatory requirements as a justification to limitations of 
the free movement of goods will be described, both regarding its creation and 
interpretation by the Court. Thereafter, the inclusion of environmental 
protection as a mandatory requirement will be described as well as how the 
Court has reasoned regarding which measures can constitute an environmental 
protection mandatory requirement. Connected to the latter, the issue of 
whether environmental protection as a mandatory requirement can justify 
discriminatory measures will be discussed. 
 
As will be argued in this section, the application of multilevel governance on 
the case law of these topics highlights the active role of the Court in creating 
and shaping the law. Moreover, the case law shows how the Court further 
legitimizes its reasoning with reference to various actors and legal orders. 
Moreover, the unclear case law regarding which kinds of measures 
environmental protection as a mandatory requirement can justify, can be 
understood as a way of creating a larger room for the Court to continuously 
shape the law.  
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3.2.2.1 Creation and Legitimization of Environmental Protection as a 
Mandatory Requirement 
3.2.2.1.1 Creation and Nature of Mandatory Requirements 
In addition to Art 36 TFEU as a justification for limiting free movement of 
goods, as discussed above, the Court in its case law has created another ground 
of justification; mandatory requirements.94  
 
The justification of mandatory requirements was first introduced in the classic 
case of Cassis de Dijon.95 The case concerned a German legislation requiring a 
certain alcohol level for a beverage to be named liqueur.96 The Court stated 
that this measure constituted a limitation to free movement of goods.97 
However, it was possible for such measure to be justified if it was necessary 
due to “mandatory requirements” recognized by Community law.98 In the case 
of Cassis de Dijon, the German state argued that the measure was aimed at 
protecting public health99 and consumer protection.100 However, the Court 
argued that the measure at hand did not have the aims claimed by the state, 
and thus could not justify the limitation to free movement of goods.101 
 
Following case law has confirmed the justification of mandatory requirements, 
and has also held that mandatory requirements can only be applied if the 
measure applies to domestic and imported products without distinction (i.e. 
being non-discriminatory)102, and is proportionate.103 Furthermore, mandatory 
requirements has in subsequent case law come to include various aims 
                                                
94 Mandatory requirements have also been refered to as e.g.”overriding requirements” (see e.g. 
C-573/12 Ålands vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten [2014] EU:C:2014:2037 para 76) and ”the rule 
of reason” (see e.g. Gormley (2005). In this thesis the term ”mandatory requirements” will be 
used. 
95 C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] EU:C:1979:42. 
96 ibid para 1. 
97 ibid para 15. 
98 ibid para 8. 
99 ibid para 9. 
100 ibid para 12. 
101 ibid para 14. 
102 C-788/79 Criminal proceedings against Herbert Gilli and Paul Andres [1980] EU:C:1980:171 para 
6.  
103 C-6/81 V Industrie Diensten Groep v J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV [1982] EU:C:1982:72 
para 10. 
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(including environmental protection, as discussed in section 3.2.2.1.2), and has 
justified a wide variety of measures limiting the free movement of goods.  
Mandatory requirements as a justification is entirely created by the Court and 
has no explicit basis in the Treaties.104 We can thus see how the Court is taking 
an active role in creating the law. As has been presented, the Court justifies the 
creation by referring to the internal logic of the community legal order since 
the mandatory requirements need to be “recognized by Community law”. 
Thus, both the Court itself, but also the wider EU legal order are important in 
the creation of mandatory requirements.  
 
The nature of mandatory requirements has been much debated. How does the 
mandatory requirements relate to the framework of free movement of goods? 
In the doctrinal debate, three propositions on the nature of mandatory 
requirements have been made. These will here be presented and analyzed. 
Mandatory requirements are seen as either (1) taking the measure at hand out 
of the scope of Art 34 TFEU,105 or (2) expanding the justifications in Art 36 
TFEU, or (3) an equity rule not changing the free movement law as such, but 
rather its applicability, and thus working as an interim relief on a case-by-case 
basis.106  
 
The different ways of understanding the nature of mandatory requirements 
does in turn give different views on the action of the Court, when creating the 
ground of justification. If seeing the nature of mandatory requirement as in 
proposition (1) or (2), it can be argued that the Court has gone quite far in 
shaping the Treaties. Applying the theory of multilevel governance, the 
creation of the Court thus highlights the tension in governance between the 
Member States, and EU and in particular the Court.  
 
If considering the nature of mandatory requirements to be as in proposition 
(3), that is as tools of equity, and thus temporary justification applicable as long 
as the legislator does not choose to explicitly include environmental protection 
                                                
104 Gormley (2005) p. 22. 
105 See section 3.1. 
106 Gormley (2005) p. 26. See also Gormley (2011) p .85. 
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as a justification in the Treaty text, the creation of mandatory requirements 
consists of a more reflexive process on part of the Court. On the one hand, the 
Court creates the (temporary) measure, mandatory requirement. At the same 
time the Court leaves space for the Member States to introduce its own 
measures, and when these are accepted as justified measures, they thus shape 
the content and understanding of the EU law, insofar as these are compatible 
with the Treaties. On the other hand, with the understanding of mandatory 
requirements being a temporary justification, the Court also leaves space for 
the Member States to explicitly include environmental protection as a 
justification in the Treaties.  
 
The nature of the mandatory requirement thus strongly impacts on how to 
perceive the role of the Court itself, in creating and shaping EU law on this 
matter, but also how this affects other actors, especially the Member States. 
 
3.2.2.1.2 Environmental Protection as a Mandatory Requirement 
Above, mandatory requirements as a justification has been described and 
discussed in general. In this section, environmental protection as a mandatory 
requirement will be discussed. The fact that environmental protection could 
constitute a mandatory requirement was first implied by the Court in 
ADBHU,107 and later explicitly confirmed in Danish Bottles.108 
 
The preliminary reference of ADBHU concerned a national implementation of 
an EU directive. The measure regarded restrictions of handling waste oils, 
insofar as only certain entities were allowed to burn such oils.109 The aim of the 
directive, on which the measure was based, was environmental protection.110 
Even though environmental protection was not a part of the Treaty framework 
at the time of the judgments (it was included in the Treaties two years later),111 
the Court still stated that environmental protection constituted “one of the 
                                                
107 C-240/83 Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs d'huiles usagées (ADBHU) 
[1985] EU:C:1985:59. 
108 C-302/86 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark [1988] EU:C:1988:421. 
109 C-240/83 para 4. 
110 ibid para 25. 
111 Jacobs (2006) p. 187. 
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community’s essential objectives”.112 The conclusion of the Court can possibly 
be attributed to the fact that environmental considerations had at the time 
become increasingly important within the Community.113 However, such 
development was not discussed in the judgment of the Court, although it had 
been raised by the parties and intervening parties.114 The inclusion of 
environmental protection as a mandatory requirement can thus be seen as the 
Court continuing to create the law, and exercising formal governance, without 
recognition of other entities also influencing in the creation and shaping of the 
law. 
 
In Danish Bottles the Court confirmed the existence of environmental 
protection as a mandatory requirement, which was only implicitly affirmed in 
ADBHU.115  
“The Court has already held in [ADBHU] that the protection of the environment is 
'one of the Community's essential objectives', which may as such justify certain 
limitations of the principle of the free movement of goods.[…] [I]t must therefore be 
stated that the protection of the environment is a mandatory requirement which may 
limit the application of Article 30 of the Treaty.”116 
 
In justifying its explicit inclusion of environmental protection as a mandatory 
requirement, the Court in Danish Bottles strengthened this assertion by referring 
to the SEA, implemented after the settling of the ADBHU case.117  
 
Environmental protection as a mandatory requirement is thus created by the 
Court, and has no explicit foundation in treaty law. By adding environmental 
protection as one such mandatory requirement, the Court can be seen to affirm 
its own position in creating and shaping EU law. In order to justify the 
creation of environmental protection as a mandatory requirement, the Court 
refers to various actors. 
                                                
112 C-240/83 para 13. 
113 Jacobs (2006) p. 187ff. 
114 see e.g. C-240/83, Facts and Issues para 2.1. 
115 C-302/86 para 8. 
116 C-302/86 para 8f. 
117 C-302/86 para 8. 
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After having described the reasoning of the Court when including 
environmental protection as a mandatory reqirement, the focus will now shift 
to how the Court has assessed various measures, and on which grounds such 
measures have been deemed to protect the environment, and thus being 
capable of falling within the justification of environmental protection as a 
mandatory requirement.  
 
In order for a measure protecting the environment to be used as a justification, 
the underlying aim of the Member State applying the measure must be 
assessed. The Court has stated that measures taken for purely economic 
reasons cannot serve as justifications to a restriction of free movement of 
goods.118 In Dusseldorp,119 a preliminary ruling concerning a Member State 
measure regulating the export of waste, the Court stated that the “object […] 
of such a provision is to restrict export and to provide a particular advantage 
for national production”.120 Although a measure thus would de facto protect the 
environment, as consistent with the Treaty provisions of environmental 
protection, the measure would be impermissible. The Court thereby 
emphasizes the importance of the internal logic of the EU market.121  
 
When assessing whether the objective of the measure at hand could be seen as 
protecting the environment, the Court in Ålands Vindkraft,122 a preliminary 
ruling regarding a national implementation of a directive on the promotion of 
green enegry, stated that the objective was an important part of achieving the 
Union’s combat against climate change.123 The Court referred to the Kyoto 
Protocol as well as “other Community and international greenhouse gas emission 
reduction commitments”.124 
 
                                                
118 See e.g. Snell, Jukka (2005) ”Economic Aims as Justification for Restrictions on Free 
Movement” in: Schrauwen, Anette. (ed) Rule of Reason: Rethinking another Classic of European Legal 
Doctrine. Groningen: Europa Law Publishing. 
119 C-203/96 Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] EU:C:1998:316 
120 ibid para 42. 
121 See Snell (2005) p. 48. 
122 C-573/12. 
123 ibid 78. 
124  ibid para 79. 
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Ålands Vindkraft was followed by the Essent125 judgment, a preliminary ruling 
also concerning a measure regarding the promotion of use of renewable energy 
sources for the production of electricity. In the case, the Court primarily 
evaluated the measure at hand within the framework of mandatory 
requirements, but also made reference to Art 36 TFEU. In Essent, the Court 
referred to the aim of combatting climate change, and underlined that this is a 
pledge that both the EU and its Member States have taken.126 Moreover the 
Court makes references to the Kyoto Protocol, and linked the measure at hand to 
this international agreement. The Court furthermore referred to that the 
measure also protects the health and life of humans and animals, as stated in 
Art 36 TFEU.127 Lastly the Court made reference to provisions in EU primary 
and secondary law. Based on the abovementioned considerations, the Court 
stated that the measure could in principle justify barriers to the free movement 
of goods.128 
 
The Court has in some cases referred to the EU legal order when assessing the 
aim of the measure. Examples of this is Sydhavens sten & grus,129 in which the 
Court gave a general comment on the justifications based on the protection of 
the environment, that such justifications, in particular if they concern the 
principle that environmental damage should be rectified at source, as stated in 
Art 130r(2) of the Treaty.130 
 
When assessing the aim of measures, in the respect of whether they can be 
seen as protecting the environment, the references of the Court to other actors 
and legal orders show how this area is shaped by various interests.  
 
                                                
125 C-204/12 to C204/12 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en 
Gasmarkt [2014] EU:C:2014:2192. 
126 ibid para 91. 
127 ibid para 92. 
128 ibid para 95. 
129 C-209/98. 
130 C-209/98 para 48. 
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3.2.2.2 Mandatory Requirements as Applicable Only to Non-
Discriminatory Measures? 
According to the Cassis de Dijon formula of the mandatory requirements, the 
latter can only justify a measure if the measure in question is non-
discriminatory.131 However, as various authors have observed, there is a general 
problem of consistency in the case law of the Court on this matter,132 especially 
in the case of environmental protection as a mandatory requirement.133  
 
The requirement of the measure being non-discriminatory has arguably been 
sidestepped in some cases. This has been done in two ways: firstly the Court 
has in some cases deemed a measure to be non-discriminatory, although the 
measures indeed seem to be discriminatory. Secondly, the Court has in some 
cases chosen not to assess the (non)discriminatory nature of the measure, and 
gone straight to a proportionality test.134  
 
One example of the Court deeming seemingly discriminating measures to be 
non-discriminatory is the case of Wallonian Waste.135 Wallonian Waste was an 
infringement case regarding a Member State measure prohibiting waste not 
coming from the region of Wallonia to be the dumped or recycled in that 
region.136 As many scholars have observed, this measure indeed seemed 
discriminatory.137 However, the Court came to the conclusion that this measure 
was not, basing its reasoning regarding the non-discriminatory nature on the 
“differences between waste produced in different places”. 138 The Court 
justified its conclusion by referring to Art 130r(2) of the Treaty, stating that 
environmental protection should be remedied at source.139 The Court 
furthermore related the principle in the Treaty, to the corresponding principle 
                                                
131 There are various etiquettes to such measures. Some authors refer to meaures as applicable 
with or without distinction, whereas other authors refer to the same chategories as 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures. See e.g. De Sadeleer (2012) p. 297. 
132 See e.g. Poncelet (2014) p. 189. 
133 Gormley (2011) p. 86ff. 
134 See e.g. Jacobs (2006) p. 190ff. 
135 C-2/90 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [1992] EU:C:1992:310. 
136 ibid para 1. 
137 Gormley (2011) p. 86. For a slightly different approach, see Nowag (2017) p. 133-34. 
138 C-2/90 para 36. 
139 ibid para 34. 
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in the Basel Convention, which the Court notes that the Community is a party 
to.140  
 
As has been said, the reasoning of the Court in Wallonian Waste has been widely 
criticized for being internally illogical .141 Moreover, some have criticized the 
arguing of the case of being result-oriented, and influenced by political, rather 
than legal considerations.142 From a multilevel governance perspective, such 
political influences, leading to an outcome affecting the law is of great interest. 
However, apart from the dubious reasoning of the Court, direct references to 
such political considerations are (naturally) not made in the argumentation of 
the Court.   
 
Dusseldorp143 is another example of an environmental protection case where the 
Court deemed a seemingly discriminatory measure144 to be non-discriminatory 
and thus, in principle, able to be justified by mandatory requirements.145  
 
Moreover, the Court has omitted to make an assessment if the measure at hand 
is discriminatory or not. One example of such an instance is PreussenElektra,146 a 
preliminary ruling concerning the obligation on operators to buy electricity 
from renewable sources from their area of supply, and at a fixed minimum 
price.147 After confirming that the measure limited the free movement of 
goods,148 the Court, instead of assessing whether the measure was 
discriminatory or not, went straight to assess the proportionality of the 
measure. The proportionality assessment of the case will be analyzed in section 
3.3.  
 
                                                
140 ibid para 35. 
141 See e.g. Poncelet (2013) p. 186. 
142 Gormley (2005) p. 31.   
143 C-203/96. 
144 Poncelet (2013) p. 187. 
145 C-203/96 para 43. 
146 C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reußenköge III GmbH 
and Land Schleswig-Holstein [2001] EU:C:2001:160. 
147 ibid para 20. 
148 C-379/98 para 69ff. 
 31 
One possible way of explaining the dispersive case law is to see environmental 
protection as a special mandatory requirement. Environmental protection 
differs from other mandatory requirements, both in the type of interests that 
such measures want to protect – often being interests which transcend national 
boundaries – and also due to the strong position of environmental protection 
within the EU law.149 
 
As has been shown above, the case law of the Court regarding which kinds of 
measures are capable of being justified though environmental protection as a 
mandatory requirement is not clear. The Court in some cases legitimizes its 
reasoning with references to e.g. the EU legal framework and international 
conventions. Apart from such direct references, it can be argued that the 
inconsistence in case law gives the Court a wide margin to shape the law, and 
creating a position for itself to be a strong actor. 
 
3.3 The Proportionality Test 
As has been described in sections 3.1 and 3.2, there are two ways of justifying 
measures limiting the free movement of goods due to environmental 
protection; Art 36 TFEU and mandatory requirements. If a measure falls under 
one of these provisions, it must moreover be proportionate. In this section the 
proportionality test will be described.  
 
When assessing the proportionality of a measure protecting the environment, 
questions of the level of protection may arise, although such level of protection 
rests within the discretion of the Member States.150 The Court has confirmed 
that Member States may choose the level of protection they want to pursue, as 
long as they are “taking into account the requirements of the Treaties”.151 
However, the Court has indirectly assessed the level of protection chosen by 
                                                
149 Nowag (2017) p. 158ff. 
150 See Langer, Jurian and Wiers, Jochem (2000). “Danish Bottles and Austrian Animal 
Transport: The Continuing Story of Free Movement, Environmental Protection and 
Proportionality” in Review of European Community & International Environmental Law. Vol. 9 Issue 
2, pp. 188-192. p. 192. 
151 Nijman para 14; C-272/80 Criminal proceedings against Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor 
Biologische Producten BV [1981] EU:C:1981:312 para 12. 
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the Member States.152 In the Case of Danish Bottles,153 the Court stated that one 
part of the measure at hand protected the environment to a “very considerable 
degree”.154 
 
The proportionality test is often conceptualized as a three step test; (1) 
assessment of the suitability of the measure in relation to the aim,155 (2) 
assessment of whether less restrictive measures could reach the aim,156 and (3) 
a proportionality test stricto sensu.157 However, in practice the proportionality 
test is done in various ways. In some cases a very short proportionality 
assessment is done,158 while in others a fuller assessment is done.159 Hereunder, 
the proportionality assessment in some selected cases will be described and 
analyzed. 
 
In the proportionality assessment in Mickelson & Roos,160 a preliminary ruling 
concerning the restriction of watercrafts in Swedish waters,161 the Court left a 
wide margin of appreciation for the Member State to choose a suitable 
measure to protect the environment. Although there were alternative measures 
available that would achieve the same level of protection of the environment, 
the alternatives were administratively more complex and costly. The Court 
deemed the measure of the Member State to be proportional.162  
 
Toolex163 was a preliminary ruling regarding a Member State measure 
prohibiting the use of a certain chemical, with a system of individual 
exemptions.164 When doing the proportionality assessment in the case, the 
Court noted that individual exemptions were possible to obtain for a limited 
period, in case that the applicant could provide a plan for eventually 
                                                
152 C-302/86. See also Langer and Wiers (2000) p. 188. 
153 C-302/86. 
154 C-302/86 para 20. 
155 de Sadeleer (2012) p. 309. 
156 ibid p. 310. 
157 ibid p. 320.  
158 see e.g. C-443/02 Nicolas Schreiber [2004] EU:C:2004:453 para 48. 
159 See e.g. C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] EU:C:2009:336 
para 9. 
160 ibid. 
161 ibid para 14. 
162 C-142/05 para 36ff; see also Poncelet (2013) p. 196. 
163 C-473/98. 
164 ibid para 34. 
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substituting the chemical in question with another substance. The Court 
concluded that the individual exemption system was appropriate and 
proportionate.165 To support this conclusion the Court noted that the system 
was in line with the substitution principle, as incorporated in, inter alia, various EU 
directives.166 The Court in this case uses the internal logic of the EU legal 
system to deem a Member State measure proportionate.  
 
In PreussenElektra167, a preliminary ruling concerning the obligation on 
operators to buy electricity from renewable sources from their area of supply, 
and at a fixed minimum price,168 the Court started its proportionality 
assessment of the measure by stating that account should be taken both of the 
aim of the measure, and of the “particular features of the electricity market”.169 
When assessing the aim of the measure - protection of the environment -, the 
Court noted that the measure lead to the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, “which the European Community and its Member States have 
pledged to combat”.170 Furthermore the Court connected this reduction to the 
implementation of the “objectives which the Community and its Member 
States intend to pursue in implementing the obligations which they contracted 
by virtue of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change”.171 When assessing the aim of the measure the Court also noted the 
connection of the aim to the EU legal order by linking the aim to the interests 
covered by Art 36 TFEU - in this case “the health and life of humans, animals 
and plants” – as well as the environmental integration principle as incorporated 
in EU primary law.172 Regarding the features of the electricity market, the 
Court noted that it is difficult to determine where the electricity was made, 
once in the grid.173 It also noted that the Commission, in its proposal for a 
directive relating to electricity, had underlined the importance of creating a 
                                                
165 ibid para 46. 
166 ibid para 47. 
167 C-379/98. 
168 ibid para 20. 
169 ibid para 72. 
170 ibid para 73. 
171 ibid para 74. 
172 ibid para 75f. 
173 ibid para 80. 
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“system of certificates of origin”.174 Based on the abovementioned 
considerations regarding the aim of the measure and the features of the 
electricity market, the Court deemed the measure to be proportional.175As can 
be seen the Court does not make a classic proportionality assessment, and the 
weighing of different interests is not explicit. Moreover, in legitimizing its 
reasoning, the Court refers to various actors and legal spheres in its 
proportionality test undertaken in PreussenElektra. In the assessment of the aim, 
the references to Member States, the EU and their obligations regarding the 
international convention highlights how the reasoning in this case can be seen 
as influenced in various steps since the obligations of the EU in accordance 
with the convention, as approved by the Member States, has implications for 
how the Court assesses the measures at hand.  
 
References to international conventions in the proportionality test, as in 
PreussenElektra, can also be found in other cases.176 For example, in Bluhme,177 
the Court made a more explicit proportionality test, stating that the measure at 
hand, the prohibition of keeping of bees other than a species of bees native to 
the specific island in question,178 needed to be necessary and proportionate in 
relation to its aim.179 In order to assess the measure, the Court thereafter said 
that the method used in the measure was recognized in the Rio Convention, 
which in turn was (regarding this aspect) incorporated in Community law.180 
Such reference was also made in Ålands Vindkraft,181 a preliminary ruling 
regarding a Member State measure concerning the issuing of certificates (used 
to indicate to the customers the proportion of energy made from renewable 
sources)182 only to electricity produced in that Member State.183 The Court 
started the proportionality assessment by stating that the measure needed to be 
“appropriate for securing the attainment of the legitimate objective pursued 
                                                
174 ibid para 79f. 
175 ibid para 81. 
176 see Nowag (2017) p. 174. 
177 C-67/97. 
178 ibid para 2. 
179 ibid para 35. 
180 ibid para 36. 
181 C-573/12. 
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and it must be necessary for those purposes”.184 In the proportionality 
assessment, the Court referred to the importance of ensuring the 
implementation of the international environmental commitments entered into 
by the European Union”.185  
 
Moreover the Court has underlined the importance of the Member State to 
consider alternative measures, as a part of the proportionality test.186 In 
Commission v Austria,187 the measure at hand consisted of a restriction of certain 
kinds of vehicles to use a particular part of the highway.188 The Court stated 
that the state was “under a duty to examine carefully the possibility of using 
measures less restrictive of freedom of movement, and discount them only if 
their inadequacy, in relation to the objective pursued, was clearly 
established.”189 The Court notes that this is in line with what the Advocate- 
General held in his Opinion.190 
 
As has been shown above, the Court in its proportionality assessment 
frequently legitimizes its reasoning with reference to different actors, such as 
the Commission and Member States, as well as to different legal spheres, such 
as the EU legal order and international agreements. The formal governance of 
the Court can be highlighted in the proportionality assessment. However, the 
proportionality assessment of the Court is, naturally, shaped by the notion of 
different interests being weighed against each other.  
 
                                                
184 ibid para 83. 
185 ibid para 97. 
186 C-320/03 para 87. 
187 C-320/03. 
188 ibid para 1. 
189 ibid para 87. 
190 ibid para 89. 
 36 
4 Analysis 
In this chapter, the application of multilevel governance to the case law of the 
Court will be analyzed. The strengths and weaknesses of the theory when 
doing such an application will be identified and analyzed in sections 4.1. and 
4.2, respectively. 
 
4.1 Strengths of Applying the Theory of Multilevel 
Governance on Case Law of the Court of Justice 
In this section the strengths of the theory of multilevel governance when 
applied to the case law will be discussed. It will herein be argued that the 
theory highlights the active role of the Court, as an actor both creating and 
shaping law. Moreover it shows how the Court uses references to both other 
actors as well as legal orders in order to legitimize its reasoning.  
 
When applying the theory of multilevel governance on the case law of the 
Court, the notion of various actors shaping the law in question is highlighted. 
As has been seen in Chapter three, the Court makes references to e.g. its own 
case law, the EU legal framework, international conventions, the Commission, 
and the Advocates-General.  
 
Regarding how these actors influence the law, the application of the theory of 
multilevel governance on the case law highlights mainly two ways through with 
such influence is done. Firstly the Court itself can be seen to formally create 
and shape law. Secondly the references of the Court to other actors and legal 
spheres can arguably be seen as these actors indirectly shaping the law.  
 
When applying the theory of multilevel governance on the case law, the active 
role of the Court of creating and shaping the law in question is highlighted. In 
the field of free movement of goods and environmental protection as a 
justification to limitations of the former, the Court creates the law insofar as it 
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creates the mandatory requirement, and subsequently includes environmental 
protection in that ground of justification.  
 
Moreover the Court shaping the law is emphasized, both in regards of how it 
interprets Art 36 TFEU, and mandatory requirements. As has been discussed 
in Chapter Three, the rather unclear case law regarding the justifiability of 
discriminatory measures under the provision of mandatory requirements can 
be seen as a way of the Court to indirectly shape the law. The lack of clarity 
furthermore gives the Court the possibility to further shape the law in future 
case law. The proportionality test is another example of how the Court shapes 
the law, the weighing of interests is inherent to the test, however, which 
interests the Court chooses to highlight, as well as the various differences in 
how the test is applied, gives room for the Court to shape the law. 
 
The application of multilevel governance also highlights how the Court 
legitimizes its creation and shaping of the law by referring to various actors and 
legal spheres. Through such references in the legitimization of the Court, the 
actors and legal orders mentioned can thus be understood as indirectly shape 
the law, and thus exercise governance. Such references are arguably vital for 
understanding the case law, thus indirectly influencing the law itself. Moreover, 
the Court by these references shows how it deems these actors and legal orders 
to be important when understanding the law. 
 
Using the theory of multilevel governance on the case law of the Court, three 
main processes of governance can be identified in the case law studied. These 
are the explicit creation of law, the references shaping the law, and the 
ambiguity of the case law. Firstly, regarding the explicit creation of the law, this 
process can be understood as reflexive insomuch as that other actors and legal 
spheres are taken into account when creating the law. The creation of 
mandatory requirement, and the inclusion of environmental protection in the 
former, shows how the Court creates the law with references to e.g. the EU 
legal order. By taking legitimizing its reasoning in such a way, the process 
arguably show signs of reflexivity. 
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Secondly, as has been discussed above, the references of the Court are one of 
the processes through which the law is shaped in the case law. This process 
can be seen as reflexive insomuch as it in various cases involves various 
references to different actors. 
 
Thirdly, as has been pointed out in Chapter three, the case law of the Court is 
in some cases ambiguous. The clearest example of this is the question of 
whether both discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures can be used as 
justifications as mandatory requirements. Through the unclear case law, the 
Court arguably leaves room for itself to further shape the law in future cases.  
Moreover, these three processes can be seen as together creating a reflexive 
process through which the law in the field is shaped. 
 
Apart from the more concrete ways that the Court creates and shapes the law, 
itself and thorough references to other actors, the “silences” in the case law 
can be interpreted as leaving the room for Member States, alternatively the EU 
to indirectly shape the law, insomuch as that the Court does not shape the law, 
on such matters. 
 
The theory of multilevel governance thus has various strengths when applied 
to the case law of the Court. The application of the theory on the case law of 
the Court can highlight the direct and indirect influence of various actors in the 
creating shaping of the law, as exemplified above. 
 
4.2 Weaknesses of Applying the Theory of 
Multilevel Governance on Case Law of the Court 
of Justice 
Applying the theory of multilevel governance as a method in a case study is not 
unproblematic. This section of the analysis will be dedicated to discussing the 
weakness of the theory regarding its applicability on the case law of the Court. 
It will herein be argued that the weaknesses of the application can be foremost 
related to the inherent nature of judgments of the Court. 
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The very nature of case law is a weakness when assessing it through the theory 
of multilevel governance. Due to the position of the Court, it is arguably not in 
its interest to make explicit references to how other actors and legal orders 
influence the judgments. Although we can see references to such other actors 
and legal orders, it is possible that the Court in many cases does not mention, 
at least not explicitly, how the law is created and shaped through the case law. 
Thus it is worth to keep in mind the possibility of “silences” of the case law, as 
well as observe the implicit references to law making as expressed through the 
case law. 
 
As has been seen in the previous section, by applying the theory of multilevel 
governance on the case law of the Court, various actors and legal spheres are 
highlighted. However, all actors relevant within the theory cannot be identified 
in the case law of the Court. As has been described in Chapter two, a key 
element of multilevel governance is that it recognizes that various actors, on 
different levels, shaping the creation and shaping of law. Examples of such 
levels are sub-national, national, and supra-national actors. When the case law 
studied has been analyzed it has been apparent that the Court makes few 
explicit reference to e.g. sub-national actors when creating and shaping the law. 
If such sub-national actors thus shape the law, it is not explicit in the 
judgments of the Court, since it does not seem to refer to such actors in order 
to legitimize the creation and shaping of the law in question.  
 
As has been discussed in the Chapter above, some scholars argue that the 
Court in certain cases has been influenced by political reasons in its judgments. 
This can arguably sometimes be seen implicitly in the case law of the Court. 
However, studying the argumentation of the Court in the judgments does not 
necessarily always reveal such political considerations, nor for that matter other 
actors or legal spheres that the Court uses to legitimize its reasoning.  
 
It can furthermore be noted that the analysis regarding mandatory 
requirements highlighted the influence of more actors than the analysis 
regarding Art 36 TFEU. This is possibly due to the fact that art 36 TFEU is 
enshrined within the Treaties, and has thus a different legal basis.  
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Moreover, the exact relation between the different actors is not necessarily 
made explicit in the case law. Many times, only indirect references to such 
dynamics can be identified, through the legitimization of the Court in its 
judgments. The process in which various actors shape the law, though the case 
law, is thus not always clear. Although such processes can be identified, as 
exemplified in section 4.1., some caution must be taken insofar how well 
processes can be understood, since they are not explicit. 
 
As has been described above, there are weaknesses of using the theory of 
multilevel governance on the case law of the Court. These weaknesses concern, 
amongst other, the issue of the silences left in the case law, but also how the 
governance processes are not always clearly explained. These weaknesses can 
arguably be the consequence of the very nature of case law. These weaknesses 
must be taken into account when applying the theory on the case law of the 
Court. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has identified key concepts of the theory of multilevel governance. 
The theory has subsequently been applied to the case law of the Court 
regarding environmental protection as a justification to limitations to free 
movement of goods. Thereafter the weaknesses and strengths of the theory as 
applied to the case law of the Court have been identified and analyzed. 
 
It has been argued that when analyzing the case law of the Court using the 
theory of multilevel governance, the analysis shows that the theory has various 
strengths when applied to the case law of the Court. When applying the theory, 
instances of various actors, shaping the law in a reflexive process can be 
identified. However, some weaknesses have also been observed when the 
theory has been applied to the case law of the Court. These weaknesses are 
foremost due to the nature of case law, and the way that the Court formulates 
its judgments.  
 
Keeping the weaknesses of the applicability of the theory of multilevel 
governance in mind, the theory can thus be applied to widen and deepen the 
understanding of how the law is created and shaped in the EU through the 
case law of the Court. Once the law making process though the case law has 
been identified, using the theory, it can subsequently be analyzed e.g. regarding 
the democratic legitimacy of the process creating the law, as was discussed in 
Chapter two. 
 
In order to deepen the understanding of the applicability of the theory of 
multilevel governance on the case law of the Court, further research would be 
welcomed. Such further research could include applying the method on the 
case law of other fields of EU law. Another way to deepen the understanding 
of the applicability, weaknesses and strengths of the theory on the case law of 
the Court could be done by applying it not only on the judgments of the Court, 
but also on arguments of the parties and the opinions of the Advocates-
General, thus placing the case law in a wider context. Moreover, as has been 
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underlined above, the theory of multilevel governance can be used as a 
steppingstone to understand how law is created and shaped through the case 
law of the Court and thereafter analyzed. Such future research would be 
welcomed.  
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